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Payne v. Tennessee: VICTIM
IMPACT EVIDENCE IS
CONSTITUTIONALL Y PERMISSIBLE IN THE SENTENCING PHASE OF A
CAPITAL TRIAL.
In Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.
Ct. 2597 (1991), the United States
Supreme Court held that victim
impact evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding is not per se
barred by the Eighth Amendment.
In an opinion delivered by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Court held
that evidence of the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the
victim's family can be considered
by the sentencing jury, as well as
argued by the prosecutor at a capital
sentencing hearing. In so holding,
the Court overruled the recently established precedent of Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987),
and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490
U.S. 805 (1989).
Pervis Tyrone Payne was convicted by ajury oftwo counts offirst
degree murder and one count of
assault with intent to commit murder. The murder victims were
Charisse Christopher and her two
year old daughter, Lacie. Herthree
year old son, Nicholas, survived the
assault. Commenting in his closing
argument as to the lasting effects of
the murders on Nicholas, the prosecutor encouraged the jury to return
a verdict that demonstrated justice
was done. During the sentencing
phase ofthe trial, the defendant presented mitigating evidence through
testimony by his mother, father, girlfriend and a clinical psychologist.
The state then offered the testimony
of Charisse's mother, Mary
Zvolanek, who testified as to how
Nicholas had cried because he
missed his mother and sister. The
defendant was sentenced to death
on each ofthe murder counts and 30

years imprisonment for the assault
count.
Rejecting Payne's contention
that the admission of victim impact
evidence constituted prejudicial violations of his Eighth Amendment
rights as interpreted in Booth and
Gathers, the Supreme Court ofTennesseeaffirmedthetrialcourt'sholding. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2603-04.
The court found that even if Payne's
rights were violated under Booth
and Gathers, the violation "was
harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. (quoting State v. Payne,
791 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tenn. 1990»).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically to reconsider the
holdings in Booth and Gathers and
first reviewed the premises relied
upon in both of these decisions.
The Court specifically considered
the premises that victim impact evidence "does not reflect on the
defendant's'blameworthiness,'''and
that "only evidence addressing the
defendant's 'blameworthiness' is relevant to the capital sentencing decision." Id. at 2605. Concluding that
the Booth Court misread the established precedent in Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976), that "a capital defendant
must be treated as a uniquely individual human being," the Court
stated that such misreading unfairly
weighted the scales in a capital trial.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607. The
Court stressed that while a capital
defendant may present virtually unlimited "relevant mitigating evidence," the state is prohibited from
presentingevidencethatwouldshow
"a glimpse of the [victim's] life, or
that would demonstrate ''the loss to
the victim's family and to society."
Id.
The Court, therefore, found that
Booth deprived the state of the "full
moral force of its evidence" and
couldpreventthejuryfromevaluat-

ing "all the information necessary
for a first degree murder sentencing." Id. at 2608. Similarly, Gathers barred prosecutors from presenting victim impact evidence to the
sentencing jury. Id. at 2609. The
Court further emphasized that victim impact evidence is offered to
show "each victim's uniqueness as
an individual human being" and not
to encourage comparative judgments of victims. Id. at 2607. The
Court maintained that should evidence be introduced ''that is so unduly prejudicial, ... the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief." Id. at 2608. In overruling
these decisions, the Court reasoned
that mitigating evidence presented
by the defendant and victim impact
evidence introduced by the state are
now on equal ground - they are both
relevant and constitutionally permissible.Id. at 2609.
Finally, the petitioner argued that
the Court should adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis and not overrule Booth and Gathers. Id. Acknowledging that stare decisis is
a preferred policy, the Court coneluded that it need not follow precedent when such governing decisions
as Booth and Gathers "are unworkable or badly reasoned." Id. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
pointed out that the doctrine is a
reflection of the principal that ''the
settled practices and expectations of
a democratic society should generally not be disturbed by the courts."
Id. at 2614, (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia suggested it was
Booth, and not Payne that compromised the doctrines' fundamental
values.Id.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun, filed a powerful dissent criticizing the majority of exercising power, not reason, in its
decisionmaking. Id. at 2619
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(Marshall, 1., dissenting). Noting
that the only change in the four year
interim between the decisions in
Booth and Gathers and Payne was
the personnel ofthe Court, Marshall
maintained that the real inquiry
should be whether the majority satisfied the extraordinary showing of
special justification required before
overruling Court precedent. [d. at
2619-21.
Justice Stevens' dissent, joined
by Justice Blackmun, emphasized
that our capital punishment jurisprudence has allowed the sentencing jury to consider only mitigating
evidence concerning the offense and
the character of the defendant. [d. at
2626-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens asserted that evidence which served no purpose other
than appealing to the "sympathies
or emotions of the jurors has never
been considered admissible." [d. at
2626. The dissent accused the majority of abandoning the "rules of
relevance that are older than the
Nation itself." [d. at 2627.
With this decision, the Supreme
Court has overruled recently decided cases and disregarded precedent by holding victim impact evidence constitutionally permissible.
A state may now allow a sentencing
jury to consider victim impact evidence, and a prosecutor may argue
victim impactto the sentencingjury.
The Court's broad interpretation of
"relevant evidence" will have far
reaching implications for capital
defendants, the families oftheir victims, and to society as a whole.
- Belinda P. Gardner
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Rust v. Sullivan: SUPREME
COURT UPHOLDS AGENCY
REGULATIONS PROHIBITING THE COUNSELING,
REFERRAL OR PROVISION
OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ABORTION AS A
METHOD OF FAMILY PLANNING.
In a five to four decision, the
Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan,
III S. Ct. 1759 (1991), upheldregulations of the Public Health Services Act requiring recipients oITitie
X funds to refrain from engaging in
abortion counseling, referral, and
provision of information concerning abortion as a method of family
planning. The Court gave extreme
deference to the Department of
Health and Human Services and
upheld the regulations on the ground
of statutory construction. In addition, the Court found the regulations were not violative ofthe First
or Fifth Amendments.
Title X ofthe Public Health Service Act, 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to
300a-6), was originally enacted by
Congress in 1970 to provide federal
funding for family-planning services. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764. The
Act authorized the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (the
Secretary) to provide funding to
public or nonprofit private entities
to operate family planning projects.
The Secretary was also authorized
to promulgate such regulations as
deemed necessary to carry out the
intent of the statute. [d. (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 300(a), 300a-4 (1970».
Section 1008 of the Act provided
that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be
used in programs where abortion is
a method offamily planning." Rust,
111 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970».
In 1988, after determining that

current regulations failed to properly implement the statute, the Secretary promulgated new regulations
designed to provide "clear and operational guidance to grantees [of
Title X funds] to preserve the distinction between Title X programs
and abortion as a method of family
planning." Rust, IllS. Ct. at 1765
(quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2923-24
(1988». Specifically, the regulations attached three conditions for
receipt ofthe funds. First, the ''Title
X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion
as a method of family planning or
provide referral for abortion as a
method of family planning." Rust,
III S. Ct. at 1765 (quoting42C.F.R.
§ 59.8(a)(I». Second, recipients of
Title X funds may not engage in
activities that "encourage, promote
or advocate abortion as a method of
family planning." [d. (quoting 42
C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989». Third,
the Title X project must be "physically and financially separate" from
any prohibited activity so that an
"objective integrity and independence from prohibited activities"
remains. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765
(quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989».
The petitioners in this action were
grantees of Title X funds suing on
behalf of themselves and their patients. The petitioners challenged
the facial validity ofthe new regulations on grounds that they were not
authorized by Title X and violated
the First and Fifth Amendment rights
of Title X patients and the First
Amendment rights ofTitle X health
care providers. The District Court
for the Southern District of New
York granted summary judgment in
favor of the Secretary. Both the
Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court
first addressed the Secretary's au-

